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Agricultural  trade has been framed  by many as primarily a devel-
oped country issue in the Uruguay Round.  The most serious  agri- cultural  trade  disputes  over  subsidies  and  protectionism  have
occurred  among developed  countries,  placing  agriculture  high on their negotiating  agendas.  Developing  countries,  on the  other hand,
have  historically been afforded  special  and differential  treatment  in
the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT)  that has  pro-
vided  them  a  waiver  from  compliance  with  GATT provisions.  This
heritage,  reaffirmed  in the  Ministerial  Declaration opening the  Uru-
guay Round,  tends  to  minimize  consideration  of developing  country
issues and concerns in the negotiations.
Although  agriculture  may  remain  primarily  a  developed  country
issue during the current round, several factors suggest an increasing
role for developing  countries.  First, many feel that the success of the
more radical liberalization  proposals could be affected by the degree
of support by developing countries,  leading to more  concerted ef- forts  to  draw them  into the negotiation.  For instance,  the U.S.
proposal  for  complete  liberalization  may be  more acceptable  to  the European  Community  (EC) if key developing countries  also agree to its subsidy and market access provisions.
Second,  many feel, supported  by a growing body of research,  that trade  responses  by developing  countries  will  significantly  affect  the global  impacts of liberalization,  reinforcing the  importance  of devel- oping country participation.  Third,  some  developing country export-
ers (Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,  Columbia,  Fiji, Indonesia,  Malaysia,
the Philippines,  Thailand and Uruguay)  realize that they have some-
thing to gain  or lose and are already participating in the negotiations
as members  of the  Cairns Group.  Other developing countries,  partic-
ularly  food importers,  may join the negotiation  to protect their inter-
ests.
Farm Policy  Interventions in Developing  Countries
Developing countries tend to intervene in their farm  sectors in dif-
192ferent ways and to achieve different goals than developed countries,
and this leads  many of them to take different  positions toward
proposals  for  policy  reform  sponsored  by  developed  countries.  De-
veloping countries  also tend to face different factor endowments,  re-
source  constraints and  income distribution  patterns than developed
countries,  and may perceive  more serious internal adjustment prob-
lems from trade liberalization.
Some  of these  differences  have  been identified  by  the  Economic
Research Service  (ERS) in case studies of policy interventions  in de-
veloping  countries,  and in quantitative  estimates  of these  interven-
tions using producer  and  consumer  subsidy  equivalents  (PSEs and
CSEs).  Use of a comprehensive,  aggregate measure  of policy im-
pacts on producers,  such as  the PSE  and CSE,  has been suggested
in some GATT proposals.  They provide a convenient means of sum-
marizing policy interventions.
A summary of PSE and CSE estimates  (Table  1) suggests some  of
the more obvious differences.  While  several Newly Industrialized
Countries  (NICs)  also  provide  relatively  high  levels  of support,  de-
veloped counties  tend to provide more support to their producers
than  developing  countries.  In fact,  two  of the developing  countries
and one of the NICs tax their producers,  and the estimates for two of
the other  developing  countries  (Indonesia  and Thailand)  are  based
Table 1. Estimated Producer and Consumer Subsidy  Equivalents (1982-86  Averages)
Producer Subsidy  Consumer  Subsidy
Equivalents  Equivalents
%  of Producer Value  %  of Consumer  Value
Developed  Countries
Australia  (9)  11
Canada  (13,11)  31  -12
European Community  (13,14)  35  -15
Japan  (12,10)  72  -39
New Zealand (5)  25
United  States (12,9)  25  -12
Newly Industrialized  Countries
Argentina  (4)  -45  35
Brazil (6)  9
Mexico  (7)  32
South Korea  (10,10)  60  - 58
Taiwan  (11,9)  19  - 26
Developing Countries
India  (7,10)  -18  - 7
Indonesia  (1,1)  14  -22
Nigeria  (6,5)  5  - 7
Pakistan  (4,4)  -23  17
Thailand  (1,1)  1  21
Notes:  1) Numbers  in parentheses  indicate  number of commodities covered  in estimates  of PSEs
and CSEs, respectively.
2)  Estimates do not include exchange  rate distortions shown in Tables 3 and 5.
3)  - = Not  available.
SOURCE:  ERS estimates
193on only one crop (rice) and likely do not reflect actual aggregate  sup-
port.  A  second key  difference  shown  in  Table  1 is  that,  while  more
developed  countries tend to tax food consumers  to help pay their
producer  subsidies,  developing  countries  subsidize  consumers  with
the proceeds of their producer taxes.
Importance of Agricultural Taxation
PSE  estimates by crop  (Table  2)  and  by broad  policy  category
(Table 3)  provide more detail on the extent of agricultural taxation  in
developing  countries.  While  only one of five NICs has a negative  ag-
gregate PSE, three of five tax at least one commodity.  For the devel-
oping countries  studied,  at least two of five  have negative aggregate
PSEs and all but one had some policies that taxed producers.
Taxation  of traditional  sectors,  particularly  agriculture,  is funda-
mental in most models  of economic  development.  As new technology
and infrastructure  boost farm productivity,  labor and capital  are
drawn  out  of agriculture  to  fuel  development  of infrastructure  and
industry.  To some  extent,  the  taxes may be  recapturing  public  out-
lays  that  contribute  to  agricultural  development,  including  such
items as roads, irrigation  works or fertilizer subsidies.  Taxes may be
direct  and transparent,  such  as an  export  tax,  or they may be  indi-
rect,  taking the form of border or price policies that keep internal
farm  prices  relatively low.  And,  while  certain subsistence  or export
crops may be  taxed,  others may be subsidized  in order  to stimulate
technology  adoption or import substitution.
In many  cases,  particularly  those  in which  agriculture  is  the
largest economic  sector,  taxation  of agriculture  may be  one of the
few  practical  means  of  mobilizing resources.  Ports,  borders  and
markets  are convenient  means  of implementing  revenue  measures,
while more broadly-based  income tax measures are frequently  in-
feasible.  As  we  shall see below,  policy measures  that tax producers
may  also  be the same measures that  meet another  key  objective  of
developing country food policy-affordable  and stable food prices.
To be  sure,  agricultural  taxation  is not  always  a perfect policy,
since it can  bias the  terms of trade against agriculture,  leading  to
reduced  economic  efficiency  and growth.  There  can be  a tendency
for producer  taxes to become  excessive,  particularly  when  govern-
ments  are under the pressure  of domestic  and foreign  debt  or  high
inflation,  and taxes are  a convenient short-term measure.  In fact,
reduced  agricultural  taxation  is a  key condition  of much bilateral
and multilateral  structural adjustment lending.
The  treatment  of agricultural  taxation  in  developing  countries
presents problems for proponents of agricultural  trade liberalization,
and  for the use  of an aggregate  measure  of support  (AMS)  like the
PSE in implementing policy reform.  None of the major liberalization
proposals  before  the  GATT,  including  the  U.S.  or Cairns  Group
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fIproposals,  is  clear  on whether  they  are concerned  with eliminating
"all trade distorting measures"  or "all trade distorting  subsidies."  A
focus on  all trade distorting  measures  would target  producer  taxes
important to developing  countries.  Proponents use the classical  effi-
ciency and growth arguments  associated with free trade,  and also
frequently cite the problems created when taxes on raw materials
impart implicit  subsidies on processors and exporters  of value-added
products.
A focus only on trade distorting subsidies would leave producer
taxes intact.  Other than the development-related  arguments  men-
tioned above, proponents here argue that,  while these measures dis-
tort  free trade,  they do  so in  a way that reduces exports  and raises
imports.  These policies may not be efficient,  but they may not be at
issue in these negotiations.
In either of the above cases,  the existence  of taxing policies cre-
ates problems in the use of an AMS like the PSE to implement policy
reform.  The AMS  approach is  designed to provide  policy makers
maximum  flexibility  in targeting  specific  policy adjustments  needed
to reach an agreed upon reduction in aggregate  support.  The  ap-
proach could work well in the developed  country case where policy
interventions  are overwhelmingly  positive,  but  what happens  when
there  are significant  taxing policies?  Would it  be acceptable  for a
country to reduce  a positive  crop  PSE by  raising  taxes rather than
reducing  subsidies?  Would  it be acceptable  if a country reduced  its
AMS by raising taxes on one crop while  retaining or increasing sub-
sidies to another?  Whether negotiators target all trade  distortions  or
only  subsidies, the prevalence  of taxing policies in developing  coun-
tries  will have  to  be dealt with if these  countries  are  going  to be
drawn into the negotiation.
Emphasis on Consumer Price Stability
Consumer welfare  issues  are normally  top priorities  of food,  agri-
cultural and trade policy in developing  countries.  Low and  stable
prices  for  food  staples  are  often  a primary  objective  because  large
shares of the population live at or below the poverty line,  food ac-
counts for a large  portion of consumer budgets  and the growing ur-
ban populations can be  politically volatile.  Frequently,  maintenance
of low food prices is the means  of implicitly transferring resources
from agriculture  to other sectors.  Concern  with maintaining ade-
quate  food  supplies and  stable prices  is often an argument  for state
trading and other measures to insulate domestic  and world prices
and for import substitution to reduce dependence on world markets.
The CSE estimates (Tables 4 and 5) suggest the prevalence of eco-
nomic subsidies for consumers.  Two  out of three NICs have positive
CSEs  for at least one commodity and one has a positive aggregate
CSE. At least three  out of five  developing  countries  have a positive
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199aggregate  CSE  and four out of five subsidize consumption  of at least
one crop.  Cotton consumption  is commonly subsidized,  indicating
support  for manufacturers,  users  and/or exporters  of textiles.  Com-
parison of the PSEs and CSEs by policy category  (Tables 3 and 5)  in-
dicates  that producer  taxes and consumer subsidies are often imple-
mented  with  the  same  policy.  Typically  the policy  is  a  border
measure,  meaning that  there  is  no budgetary  cost  of the  consumer
subsidy.
Although consumer subsidies and the border measures that im-
pose them are commonly  viewed as  economically  inefficient by  free
trade  advocates,  such  policies  normally  stem  from  equity  concerns
not necessarily  addressed by competitive  free trade.  Some research
on developing  countries  permits  examination  of the  effects  of alter-
native policy  options on various  income  groups  in developing  coun-
tries (Quizon  and Binswanger;  Parikh et al.; de Janvry  and Sub-
barao).  This work suggests that adjustment  to policies seeking  to
boost  growth  with  higher  producer  and consumer  prices  can  be
quite costly  for net buyers of food,  including the urban and rural
poor.  It is not clear  from this  research  if traditional  agriculture  has
the capability to be sufficiently  price-responsive  for the income  gains
stimulated by higher prices to eventually offset the adverse  effects of
higher food prices.
Consumer impacts of policy reform are seldom discussed by devel-
oped countries,  but are likely to be a key concern  of many develop-
ing countries in the negotiations.  They would be concerned about
the adjustment  of low-income  consumers to higher  and,  possibly,
less stable internal prices,  and about having to replace subsidies  im-
posed by border measures  with costly budgetary  subsidies.  While
most would  agree that subsidies targeted  at low income  groups  are
more efficient, few developing  countries have the means to effective-
ly administer  a targeted  program.  Many importing developing coun-
tries will also be concerned  about the consumer impact of policy re-
form in developed  countries  on the  level  and stability  of world  food
prices and the availability of food aid.
Differing Policy  Instruments
Developing  countries  tend to use different  types  of policy  mecha-
nisms than developed countries, both because  they have different
goals,  and because  of the limitations  of the  available  administrative
apparatus.  These differences  will have to be accounted  for in identi-
fying feasible policy  reforms for developing  countries.  In addition,  if
a PSE or  some other AMS is  to be used in the negotiations,  some  of
these policy mechanisms create unique and difficult estimation prob-
lems.
Public Investment  in  Agriculture. Developing  countries  typically
have  undercapitalized  farm  infrastructure  relative  to  developed
200countries and  many invest  heavily in such areas as  roads,  markets,
irrigation works and research facilities.  Such investments often have
high rates of return and research has shown that they also tend to
have  positive  distributional  impacts.  High  public  good  components
as  well  as  shortages  of private  capital  require  public investment  in
these projects.  Developing  countries are obviously concerned that
the legitimacy  of such investments in public goods not be challenged,
while reform  advocates are concerned about where to draw the line
between a producer  subsidy and investment in a public good.  Incor-
poration  of long-term investments  in PSE  measures  also presents  a
difficult  methodology problem.
State Trading. Developing  countries  often rely on parastatals  to
handle all or part of domestic and foreign trade. These organizations
play a central  role in administering producer and consumer  price
policy,  collecting  revenue,  storing  and moving  commodities, regulat-
ing foreign exchange  expenditures  and insulating domestic  and for-
eign prices. There may or may not be  a parallel private  sector capa-
bility  to  assume  these  functions  under  liberalization.  Many
developing  countries would face a formidable task if required to  im-
mediately dismantle  parastatals and build viable  private institutions.
Developing  countries  with large debt or tight balance of payment
positions may be  reluctant to give up controls on trade,  particularly
when farm goods account for a large share of trade. Advocates  of
policy reform  are  concerned  with achieving  and  maintaining strong
price transmission and freer trade in the presence of parastatals.
Exchange Rate Policy. While  developed  countries  tend to have
freely  traded  currencies,  many  developing  countries  manage  their
exchange  rates to maintain  either overvaluation  (a tax  on domestic
production and a subsidy on consumption)  or undervaluation  (a sub-
sidy on production  and a tax on consumption).  Many consider  ex-
change  rate  management  an  economy-wide  policy  not appropriate
for the agriculture  negotiation,  but its  impact on agriculture  can be
major.  Also,  because  agriculture  is generally a large  sector in  devel-
oping  countries,  exchange  rate  management  could be viewed  as
agriculture-specific.  Estimates  of the impact of exchange  rate policy
on producers  and consumers for a few countries (Tables 3 and 5)  in-
dicate  its  significance.  Inclusion  of exchange  rate  distortions  would
substantially  change the  size of Argentina's  and  Mexico's  PSE and
lead to a sharp  change in the signs of Nigeria's PSE and CSE.  In
Brazil,  exchange  rate distortions fluctuated  widely from under-
valued to overvalued  during  1982-86,  but  averaged  zero  for the  pe-
riod.
Exchange rate reform is very unlikely  to become  a part of the agri-
culture negotiations.  At the same time,  it will be  difficult to accu-
rately evaluate  developing  country policy intervention in agriculture
unless exchange  rate effects  are incorporated.  The PSE framework
can  readily  accommodate  estimates  of exchange  rate  effects,  al-
201though the accurate measurement  of exchange  rate distortions pres-
ents another tough methodological problem.
Cross-Sectoral  Issues
Developing  countries are likely to be more concerned  with link-
ages  between  agriculture  and other  sectors  in the negotiations  than
are developed  countries.  Agriculture  generally  accounts  for a much larger share of output and  employment  in  developing countries  and
the size  of employment  and income  effects to  be absorbed  by  other
smaller sectors  may present more  of a problem.  Developing coun-
tries  are likely to  be very  interested in  increased  access  to markets for labor-intensive  industries  such as textiles and footwear,  and pos-
sibly even labor-intensive services  that are sensitive politically  in de-
veloped countries.
Accommodation  of cross-sector issues within the agriculture  nego- tiations would  add yet another  dimension  and complicate  the nego- tiation considerably.  The existence  of a new Multi-Fiber  Agreement
(MFA) has been used by developed countries  as an argument to de- fer discussion of textiles,  although several developed countries favor
discussion  of textiles.  No party has  yet offered  a framework  or plan
for accommodating  swaps  between the  agriculture  and the  other
sectoral negotiating  groups operating during the Uruguay Round.
Accommodating  Developing  Country Issues
The  sweeping  agricultural  policy  reform  advocated  in some  Uru-
guay Round proposals  provides both opportunities  and serious con- cerns for  developing  countries.  The  reform  proposals  were largely
conceived  to  deal with the causes of developed  country trade  prob-
lems  and may have  to be modified  in order to  bring developing
countries  into the negotiation.
Meaningful  developing country participation  will require  a new
approach  to  the accommodation  of their concerns  that moves  away from  the blanket  waiver  provided  under the  current  notion  of spe-
cial and  differential treatment.  Movement toward  clearer  identifica- tion of factors that provide  a legitimate  economic  rationale for policy
interventions  in  developing  country agriculture  would  appear  to be necessary to draw them into the process.
One simple framework has been discussed  within the context of the  U.S.  and Cairns  Group  proposals  (Mabbs-Zeno).  In  this  frame-
work,  each participant would prepare,  for  approval by the entire
group,  a country  plan for meeting the mutually  agreed  reduction  in support.  Developed  country plans  would  have two policy  "lists,"  to- gether accounting for all current policy interventions.  One  list would
be for  "covered"  policies subject to reduction in the country plan
202and one would be for those policies agreed  by the group to be trade
neutral and subject only to monitoring.
For developing countries there  would be a third  list that would
allow  them to  move policies  off the "covered"  list if they are  aimed
at a legitimate market  failure.  One  key feature  of this framework  is
that policies  rather than countries  would qualify  for exclusion.  This
would eliminate  the current  blanket  waiver  and avoid  the intracta-
ble problem of specifying appropriate  definitions of developing coun-
tries and criteria for "graduation"  to developed  country status under
the GATT.  Another important feature of this framework  is that, with
the  option  of offering to  move policies from the  "market failure"  list
to the "covered"  list,  developing countries would have some  bar-
gaining chips.  Countries arguing to keep all or most  of their policies
off the "covered"  list,  hence keeping their blanket  waiver in  effect,
would have little bargaining  power.
Drawing developing  countries  into an agreement  on liberalization
will probably also require  some explicit  recognition  of the role of ag-
ricultural  taxation.  A  resolution  of this issue  might take the  form  of
an agreement on the "disciplines"  that must be observed in phasing
out policies in the country plans. For example,  such disciplines have
already been discussed as a means of preventing increased use of
export  subsidies while other policies are reduced.  Developing  coun-
tries might be permitted to allow their taxes to offset subsidies within
commodity  groups,  but  not allow  taxes on  one  commodity  to  offset
subsidies on others. However,  rules of this sort probably must be
kept simple and to a minimum in order to facilitate  enforcement and
avoid a lengthy commodity-by-commodity  negotiation.
Systematic  accommodation  of swaps  between  agriculture and the
other sectoral negotiating groups may be one of the more  intractable
challenges  of the negotiation.  While the more  radical agricultural
proposals seek to avoid the conventional request and offer frame-
work in favor  of an aggregate  approach to agricultural  policy re-
form, request  and  offer may be the  only workable means of dealing
with cross-sector  issues. The multiple list system discussed  above, by
creating  some  bargaining  chips for  developing  countries,  may con-
tribute to more effective  bargaining for gains in other sectors,  includ-
ing textiles, after the current MFA expires.
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